OBSCENITY AND THE LAW-AN APPRAISAL
OF THE CONTEMPORARY CONCEPT
OF OBSCENITY
For decades the censors have fought to emasculate literature. They
have tried to set up the sensibilities of the pruriency-ridden as a
criterion for society, have sought to reduce the reading matter of
adults to the level of adolescents and subnormal persons, and have
nurtured evasions and sanctimonies.
The "Ulysses" case marks a turning point. It is a body blow for the
censors. The necessity for hypocrisy and circumlocution in literature has been eliminated. Writers need no longer seek refuge in
euphemisms. They may now describe basic human functions without fear of the law.'
As is most often the case with prophecy, this optimistic presage of
the nineteen thirties still remains unfulfilled.2 No doubt its author,
and the rest of the literary world, has paused to reconsider and conclude
that the anticipated rapprochement between the censor and the artist
seems destined to be further delayed.
Yet in spite of this prolonged adversity, or perhaps because of it,
pornographic "literature" has continued to thrive. In fact, it seems that
the threat of governmental suppression of obscene material has invariably been the most effective lure to "borderline" publications. It
might therefore be said that the obscenity laws regulating legitimate art
forms frustrate their purpose to "protect" society from its prurient
proclivities by indirectly enhancing the attractiveness of the most lewd
and salacious "literature" available.
The purpose of this comment is to examine obscenity laws in light
of their historical origin and current application with a view toward
determining their prospective direction.
The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." 3 The fourteenth amendment protects these rights from invasion
by state action. 4 At first blush, complete freedom of speech and of the
1 Ernst, Foreword to J. JoYCE, ULYSSES at v (cor. res. ed. 1961).
2 C. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY (1968). "The Ulysses decision

impressed the
literary world, but not the other courts." Id. at 3.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 US. 147
(1939).
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press would appear to be guaranteed. This, however, is not so. Various
limitations and exceptions do exist.
Thus, for example, any utterance, publication, or other means of
expression (hereinafter referred to as publications) which would create
a clear and present danger of generating substantial evils may be prevented by the legislature. 5 Accordingly, while one may agitate for the
purpose of securing political and social reform,6 one may not encourage
7
the violation of current law.

Furthermore, certain publications, not even initially protected, are
viewed as exceptions in that they do not conform to the fundamental
objective of the free speech or press clause of the first amendment-the
unrestricted exchange of ideas which would ultimately benefit the
American way of life.8 Among these are obscene, libelous, and insulting words, which by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. 9 These have been adjudged to be
devoid of social utility and to fall outside the contemplation of the
first amendment. Consequently, courts have refused to intervene when
legislative bodies have imposed restrictions on such matter. 10
In Roth v. United States," the Supreme Court for the first time
considered the question of whether obscenity is protected by the first
amendment. The case involved two appeals questioning the constitutionality of criminal obscenity statutes. In Roth, the defendant was
convicted of mailing obscene circulars and advertising in violation of
the federal obscenity statute.'2 He argued that the statute violated first
amendment protections involving freedom of speech. In the companion
5 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918). "The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater, and causing a panic."
Id. at 52.
6 See Roth v. United States, 354 US. 476 (1957), where the Court states that the
protection of free speech and press was designed to promote the interchange of ideas
which would foster desired political and social changes. Id. at 484.
7 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 US. 407 (1921) (restriction of a publication which villified and falsely described American participation in
W.W.I was held constitutional).
8 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964).
9 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 US. 250 (1952); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
10 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
11 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Although this is the first time the question has been squarely presented to this
Court, either under the First Amendment or under the Fourteenth Amendment,
expressions found in numerous opinions indicate . . . that obscenity is not
protected by the freedoms of speech and press.
Id. at 481.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1966) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1461,
62 Stat. 768).
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13 the defendant, who was convicted of
case of Alberts v. California,
wilfully, unlawfully and lewdly disseminating obscene matter, argued
that the obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code 14 violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court affirmed both convictions by holding that obscenity is not subject to
first amendment protection. It also set down the test for determining
whether material was obscene. The Court, by its decision, made obscenity a matter of federal constitutional law15 and superseded all previous inconsistent decisional law on the subject.' 6 The Roth test is
whether, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests of the average person. 17 Although it is clear that the matter must
be evaluated in its entirety, using the average person as the standard,"
two questions immediately arise: (1) what are prurient interests, and
(2) what community is to be the standard?
As to the first question, the Court simply stated that material appealing to prurient interests is that which has a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts.' 9 A more precise definition is found in the Model
Penal Code which defines prurient interest as "an exacerbated, morbid,
or perverted interest growing out of the conflict between the universal
sexual drive of the individual and equally universal social controls of
sexual activity." 20 This definition is particularly important since the
Court's opinion in Roth stated:

We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of ob13 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This case was argued and decided at the same time as Roth
and is reported under the same citation.
14 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN.

§ 311 (West 1955).

15 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1966).

The significance of the Roth Case is not only that it furnishes a comprehensive
definition of obscenity for modern use, but also that it makes this definition a
matter of federal constitutional law.
Id. at 1163.
16 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1214 (1966).
[N]o regulation of obscenity is valid unless it requires the application of the
proper test of obscenity enunciated in the Roth Case.
Id. at 1216.
17 354 U.S. at 489.
18 See Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960).
...[W]e can find in the Roth-Alberts majority opinion only two constitutional
requirements. The material must be judged as a whole, not by its parts in
isolation, and it must be judged by its impact upon average or normal persons,

not the weak and susceptible.
Id. at 55.
19 354 U.S. at 487, n.20.
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
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scenity developed in the case law and the definition of the A.L.I.,
Model Penal Code ... 21
Prurient interest, therefore, is seemingly a mixed emotion of psychological and/or physiological sexual longing coupled with a socially
imposed feeling of shame for desiring that which society has deemed
morally wrong.
The Court in Manual Enterprisesv. Day,22 stated that the proper
test under the federal mailing statute 3 is a national standard of decency. Generally, states have also adopted this view, at least when the
subject is published material as opposed to a live performance. 24 For
instance, in State v. Hudson County News Co. 25 the Appellate Division
of the New Jersey Superior Court stated:
It is to be presumed that the community standards of morality in
Hudson County are the same as those in any other-county in the
State or Nation. A county is a recognized subdivision of a state.
Unless it is demonstrated that the standards of morality in Hudson
County are different from those in comparable political subdivi26
sions, it cannot be said that improper standards [are] applied.
On appeal, 27 the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the above
statement by holding "that the contemporary community standard to
be applied ... is not the standard of a particular individual, group of
individuals, or locality, but it is the standard of the contemporary

2
society of this country at large."
There are jurisdictions that hold to the contrary. 29 The proponents
for the statewide community point out that standards of decency vary
from state to state. National standards make it possible to restrict publications in a state where the average person would not be offended,
and allow publications where the average person would. On the other
hand, those advocating the national norm insist that constitutional

354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
370 U.S. 478 (1962).
23 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1966) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1461,
62 Stat. 768).
24 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158, 1182-1185 (1966).
25 78 N.J. Super. 327, 188 A.2d 444 (App. Div. 1963).
26 Id. at 333, 188 A.2d at 447.
27 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).
28 Id. at 266, 196 A.2d at 235.
29 In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535 (1968), cert. denied,
395 US. 910 (1969) (live performance); State v. Miller, 145 W. Va. 59, 112 S.E.2d 472
(1960) (nude photographs); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d
545 (1963) (literary work).
21
22
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rights cannot be afforded to citizens of one state while being denied
to citizens of another.80
There is another aspect to the controversy. Political subdivisions
bear a slight relationship to the degree of sophistication among the
numbers of the political entity. Residents of rural upstate New York
are no less likely to be offended by graphic descriptions of sexual activity than Iowa farmers; while Los Angeles citizens can mingle with
the New York jet set as if the two cities were contiguous. If any relevance can be attached to the argument for a standard encompassing
less than the entire nation, the local and not the state community must
be the test. As of now, the law is still in a state of flux.31 Until the
United States Supreme Court makes a definitive statement regarding
community standards pertaining to state anti-obscenity laws, state law
would seem to be controlling.
While the national community is the standard for both state and
federal anti-obscenity statutes, should the entire community or only
the portion which is directly affected by the material be considered?
More precisely, is something obscene per se or does it only become so
under certain circumstances? Roth did not expressly provide the answer
but implied that obscenity is constant by stating that the average
person in the contemporary community would be the test.
If one purpose of anti-obscenity legislation is to protect society
from being harmed by individuals who allow themselves to be exposed
to obscene matter (since it is argued that degenerate activity is stimulated by exposure to obscenity), the constant obscenity concept may
have merit despite contrary opinion.3 2 If, however, it is the exposed
80 C. REMBAR, supra note 2. The author recounts the oral argument for the appellant
in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, stating:
It is just not consonant with the realities of modern publishing to attempt a
state-by-state censorship. We cannot have some states in which a book is published
and others in which it is not. A publisher cannot gauge his ability to publish,
which comes down to a matter of money, in that way. I say that this nation
cannot exist half censored and half free.
Id. at 461.
31 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US. 184 (1964). Mr. Justice Brennan expressed the view
that the national community should be controlling in all cases, while Mr. Chief Justice
Warren in his dissenting opinion in the same case (at 190) stated that there are no
provable national standards, and perhaps there should be none. Both opinions have been
relied on by state courts.
82 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
887 (1963).
[11he argument that obscene expression stimulates or induces subsequent
illegal conduct, even if true, falls before the fundamental proposition that society
must deal with the illegal action directly and may not use restriction of expression
as a means of control.
Id. at 938.
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who are to be isolated from the damaging effect of obscene matter,
the variable obscenity standard is the proper test. The average man is
not the norm of the community, but of the audience:
Under variable obscenity the concept of the average or normal person has little place. Instead, variable obscenity requires first a determination of the audience to which the material is primarily
directed, and then, as the standard for testing the material,3 the
postulation of a hypothetical person typical of that audience.8
When material is directed at a particular audience, courts have accepted variable obscenity,3 4 but when the distribution is to the general
public, how can a court determine the primary audience? The failure
to arrive at a satisfactory solution has kept the concept of variable obscenity from being completely recognized.
Manual Enterprisesv. Day5 expanded the obscenity standard and
limited the scope of what could be judged to be obscene. The Court
stated that proof of obscenity involves two elements: 1) patent offensiveness; and 2) prurient interest appeal. Roth's test was interpreted as
embracing the same two elements. 86 Consequently, before matter can
be adjudged obscene three elements must be present; (a) the material
must have a tendency to excite lustful thoughts (prurient appeal), (b) it
must be patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards as to the description of sexual matters, and (c) it must be
devoid of redeeming social value (as is the case of all initially unprotected speech).
Although the opinion of the Court, written by Justice Harlan,
was joined only by Justice Stewart, the requirement of patent offensiveness was adopted as constitutional precedent by state courts. In State
v. Hudson County News Co.,3 7 the highest court of New Jersey, dis-

cussing the importance of Manual Enterprises,stated:
[W]e believe that the requirement of patent offensiveness articulated in that opinion was nevertheless inherent in the Roth

opinion which approved the twofold concept expressed in the
A.L.I. proposal. Indeed, it is the characteristic of indecency which
is the basis of society's objection to obscene material, and if the
33 Supra note 18, at 78-79.
34 See, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 US. 502 (1966).
35 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
36 Id. at 486-87.

The Court of Appeals was mistaken in considering that Roth made "prurient
interest" appeal the sole test of obscenity. Reading that case as dispensing with
the requisite of patently offensive portrayal would be not only inconsistent with
§ 1461 and its common law background, but out of keeping with Roth's evident
purpose to tighten obscenity standards.
37 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).

COMMENTS

1970]

test did not include both elements, many worthwhile works in literature, science, or art would fall under the test of "prurientinterest" appeal. 38

It must be emphasized that each of the three elements, prurient
interest, patent offensiveness, and lack of redeeming social value, must
be present before something can be designated as obscene. Consequently, even under constant obscenity, peripheral groups must be
considered to determine whether they are devoid of social value.3 9
The necessity of ascertaining whether an allegedly obscene publication has social value resulted from the decision in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts,40 where the Supreme Court held that John Cleland's
Fanny Hill was not obscene because it had literary merit. The result
was that more freedom was given to writers than ever before. 4x Since
obscenity must be "utterly" without redeeming social value, the question arises as to whether a bare minimum of merit would warrant constitutional protection for a publication. Though, by virtue of the
Court's own definition, this should apparently be so, subsequent decisions indicate that it is not. Fanny Hill may arguably imply that, if
one is going to be a pornographer, one had better be a talented
pornographer.
Ginsberg v. New York, 42 passing on the validity of a state statute
which made it a misdemeanor to sell minors harmful material, held
that a different standard should apply in the case of minors.
In this case defendant, convicted of selling "girlie magazines" to a
16 year old boy, questioned the constitutionality of a New York antiobscenity statute 43 which prohibited the sale to minors of material
which would be obscene as to them, regardless of whether it would be
obscene to adults. The defendant's main contention was that the denying to minors access to material which is not obscene for adults is a
deprivation of protected liberty. The Court rejected the contention
and held that a publication may be restricted when it (1) predominantly
appeals to the prurient interest of minors, (2) is patently offensive to
38 Id. at 256, 196 A.2d at 229.
39

Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 US. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184

(1964).
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
supra note 2.
Assuming he can produce something
Consider the author at his typewriter.
not "utterly without" merit, which is equivalent to assuming that he is a writer
at all, he and his book will be safe. . . . So far as writers are concerned, there
is no longer a law of 'obscenity.
7d. at 490.
42 390 US. 629 (1968).
43 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 484-h as enacted by L. 1965, c. 327.
40

41 See C. REMBAR,
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prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to
what is suitable material for minors, and (3) is without redeeming social
importance for minors. 44 Although Ginsberg is the law, similar statutes
4
have been held void for vagueness. 5
Application of the variable obscenity concept in the case of minors
has naturally had an effect on booksellers and moving picture theater
proprietors. The film industry has established a rating system by
which minors are excluded from theatres showing certain movies, and
dealers of printed matter exercise caution in the sale of sexy books and
magazines. However, what effect did Ginsberg have on minors? Even
if one accepts the proposition that youngsters can be morally harmed
by exposure to lewdness, would anti-obscenity statutes effectively curb
the exposure? A great deal of what children read or see is acquired
secondarily, i.e. via parents or acquaintances. Thus, the only way to
keep undesirable matter out of the hands of youth is to keep it out of
the hands of adults. Unfortunately, this would reduce the adult
population to reading only what is fit for children. 46 Furthermore,
the "forbidden fruit" syndrome leads to increased interest and, perhaps, ultimately pruriency.
Freedom of speech is a personal right which is constitutionally
protected from governmental invasion. 47 Consequently, the Supreme
48
Court has jealously guarded this right against legislative restriction.
As a result procedures which a state adopts for regulating obscene
49
materials are carefully scrutinized.
Authorities are not in agreement as to whether the question of
390 US. at 646.
See, e.g., Rabesh v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968), where the Court declared a
New York criminal obscenity statute prohibiting the sale of any magazine to minors,
which would appeal to the lust of persons under age 18, void for vagueness. Though this
case is apparantly inconsistent with Ginsberg, two different sections of the NEw YORK
PENAL LAw were involved.
46 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
47 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
48 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
It has been suggested that this is a task in which our Court need not involve itself.
We are told that the determination whether a particular motion picture, book,
or other work of expression is obscene . . . can be left essentially to state and
lower federal courts, with this Court exercising only a limited review such as
that needed to determine whether the ruling below is supported by "sufficient
evidence." The suggestion is appealing, since it would lift from our shoulders
a difficult, recurring, and unpleasant task. But we cannot accept it. Such an
abnegation of judicial supervision in this field would be inconsistent with our
duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees .... Such an issue, we think, must
ultimately be decided by this Court.
Id. at 187-88.
49 See generally, Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1215 (1966).
44

45
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obscenity is one of fact, of law, or a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. 50 However, all authorities agree that, upon appeal, the
appellate tribunal is to make an independent determination of whether
the matter in question is obscene. 51 In view of the prevailing discrepancy (even in jurisdictions which treat obscenity as a question of
fact, the appellate court judges the material de novo as if it were a question of law) the most logical procedure a court of first impression can
adopt is to pass on the obscenity question before submitting it to a
52
jury.
Distributors of obscene material can be subject to criminal punish54
ment 53 as long as they are assured the right to a jury trial and counsel.
Although the term "obscene" is generally not held to be unconstitutionally vague, 55 some jurisdictions require a more precise definition
of the prohibited material.56 Such a view is not inconsistent with Roth
since in the construction of a statute statute, "a state may permit greater
freedom of speech and press than the Fourteenth Amendment would
require, although it may not permit less. ' '5 7 There are states which
limit prohibited material only when it falls within the area of "hard
core pornography."58 Others adhere strictly to the Roth definition on
the theory that "the label 'hard core' pornography is too vague to be
helpful to a court or a jury in determining whether particular material
is obscene." 5
,50 See Annot. 5 A.L.R.3d 1158, 1190-91 (1966).
51 Id. at 1191-92.
52 See State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).
The trial judge must apply the constitutional standards to the specific material,
in the light of any factual findings supported by the evidence, for if in his judgement the material cannot constitutionally be suppressed, then nothing remains
for the jury's consideration.'... Of course, if the trial judge determines that the
material is not constitutionally protected and should be submitted to the jury,
he should avoid expressing to them his opinion on the issue of obscenity.
Id. at 256-57, 196 A.2d at 230.
53 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957).
54 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S, 184 (1964).
If the proceeding involved is criminal, there must be a right to a jury trial, a
right to counsel, and all the other safeguards necessary to assure due process of
law.
Id. at 201 (Chief Justice Warren dissenting on other grounds).
55 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Embassy Pictures Corp. v. Hudson, 242
F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
56 Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227 (1959).
57 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 121 N.W.2d 545, 548 (1963).
58 See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (passing on the constitutionality of

New York obscenity statutes which had been construed by state courts to apply only to
hard core pornography); Attorney General v. Tropic of Cancer, 345 Mass. 11, 184 N.E.2d
328 (1962).
59 State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 254, 196 A.2d 225, 229 (1963).
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A defense attorney in a criminal prosecution concerning distribution of obscene materials should scrutinize the state law to determine
the extent to which the state courts have expanded on Roth in permitting greater freedom of speech and press. Since a criminal statute
which does not require knowledge that the published matter is obscene
is invalid as a matter of federal constitutional law,60 a defense attorney
"should carefully check the statute to ascertain whether, by its terms
it requires scienter; if not, it should be argued not only that the statute
is invalid but also that the Court should refuse to imply the element
of scienter." 61 The latter argument is necessary because some state
courts have construed legislation not specifically requiring scienter as
62
impliedly doing so.
Recognized constitutional safeguards unique to criminal proceedings do not come into play where the state's objective is prevention of
dissemination of obscene matter by seizure,6 3 restraint of publication
by injunction6 4 or refusal to license the publication when such license
is a prerequisite for public exhibition. 65 However, even in cases of this
nature, the first amendment guarantees require strict adherence to
constitutional procedures." The rules governing the search and seizure
of allegedly obscene matter are consequently not the same as those involving contraband. 67 A seizure of material alleged to be obscene is
invalid "if it is the product of an arbitrary, unreasonable rule of
thumb." 6 What is arbitrary depends on the circumstances. An arbitrary
60 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), which dealt with the constitutionality
of a city ordinance that made the proprietor of a bookstore absolutely liable criminally
if he had possession of a book in his store which was later judicially determined to be
obscene. Mere possession was sufficient, he did not have to be aware of the contents. The
Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional in that it restricted the sale of books
to those the proprietor had examined, thus placing an unlawful restriction on constitutionally protected matter.
61 Supra note 16, at 1218.
62 State v. Ramos, 260 Iowa 590, 149 N.W.2d 862 (1967); State v. Hudson County
News Co., 35 N.J. 284, 173 A.2d 20 (1961); People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y. 2d 342, 214 N.Y.S.2d
363, 174 N.E.2d 470 (1961).
63 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
64 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
65 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
66 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959).
67 See, e.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
It is no answer to say that obscene books are coitraband, and that consequently
the standards governing searches and seizures of allegedly obscene books should
not differ from those applied with respect to narcotics, gambling paraphernalia
and other contraband.
Id. at 211-12.
68 In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241, 245 (E.D. La. 1960).
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rule has been held to be one by which the law enforcement officers are
empowered to seize publications before a judicial determination that
the contents are obscene; 69 where the warrant authorizing the seizure
only describes the subject matter as "obscene" or "pornographic,"
leaving the determination of obscenity to the police officer; 70 or where
there is a wholesale suppression while the warrant only authorizes
seizure of a few publications. 71 On the other hand, a seizure has been
held not to be arbitrary in spite of the lack of a primary judicial determination of obscenity where there was opportunity for a judicial decision on the merits immediately after the seizure and where the re72
straint was not extensive.
The state can also suppress the publications of obscene matter by
injunction, 73 though this method of suppression has been vehemently
attacked as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 74 As in the case of
seizure, an immediate judicial determination of obscenity is a necessity.
The requirement that motion pictures be licensed before they
can be publically exhibited is-not unconstitutional per se75 but licensing procedures must conform to constitutional standards as set down
in Freedman v. Maryland.7 6 The safeguards are that:

First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor . . Second . . . the exhibitor must be assured ...that the censor will, within . . . a brief period, either issue

a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. Any restraint
imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits
must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.
Moreover ... the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial

decision.

...

77

Ordinances and statutes have subsequently been held unconstitutional
where they placed the burden on the exhibitor to show that the film
393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968).
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d
35, 281 N.Y.S.2d 316, 228 N.E.2d 379 (1967).
71 United States v. Brown, 274 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); People v. Kimmel, 34
Ill. 2d 579, 217 N.E.2d 785 (1966).
72 Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
73 Id. at 441.
Whether proscribed conduct is to be visited by a criminal prosecution or by a
qui tam action or by an injunction . . . is a matter within the legislature's range
of choice.
74 Id. at 446 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
75 See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
76 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
69 Metzger v. Pearcy,
70

77 Id.

at 58-59.
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was not obscene,78 where they did not provide for prompt judicial review, 7 9 where the censor did not have to license a film or go to court to
restrain such showing within a brief period,80 or where there was no
provision assuring final judicial decision.8 '
The Roth case has been characterized as a victory for censorship 2
and for that reason has been criticized by some legal writers83 and
judges.8 4 On the other hand, those who regard obscenity as dangerous
have welcomed it. s Both views appear to have sound reason supporting
them. Although it is natural to turn to the state for protection when
one is offended by a publication, 86 the basic principles underlying our
78

State ex rel. Londerholm v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 197 Kan. 448, 417 P.2d 255

(1966).
79 Interstate Circuit Inc. v. Dallas, 247 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Tex. 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d
590 (5th Cir. 1966).
80 Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
81 Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968).
82 See C. REMBAR, supra note 2.
The Roth case was hailed as a victory by those bent on suppression. . . . The
favorite arguments of those who opposed censorship-that obscenity was impossible to define and that there was no demonstrable connection between exposure
to it and antisocial behavior-had been explicitly rejected. . . . Obscenity was
given an elaborate definition-the prurient interest formula-which the opinion
said was only a summary of what most courts had already been saying. The
two unpalatable elements of the Hicllin rule were no longer accepted. But otherwise the old law apparently remained intact. It might indeed be said that Roth
had strengthened it. The intellectual minority was not going to have its way; the
tastes of the avantgarde would not disrupt the restraints on publication that a
majority morality required.
Id. at 51.
83 See Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity 1., 41 CoLo. L. Rxv. 1 (1969).
Despite the first amendment's unqualified prohibitions, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized two exceptions-sedition and obscenity. . . . [t]here should,
however, be none.
Id. at 1.
84 See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) where Mr. Justice Douglas,
while telling of the great pressures exacted by pro censorship groups states:
Happily we do not bow to them. I mention them only to emphasize the lack of
popular understanding of our constitutional system. Publications and utterances
were made immune from majoritarian control by the First Amendment, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. No exceptions were made, not
even for obscenity. The Court's contrary conclusion in Roth, where obscenity
was found to be "outside" the First Amendment, is without justification.
Id. at 428 (concurring opinion).
85 See, e.g., the opinion of the Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
86 See Emerson, supra note 32.
An attack upon cherished premises tends to create anxiety, especially in those
who have a strong inner need for certainty. The deviant opinion is felt as a
threat to personal security. And the response tends to be fear, hatred or a
similar emotion, from which springs a compulsion to eliminate the source of
the danger. In such circumstances it is natural to turn to the state for protection
against the suppoged evil.
Id. at 887.
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system of government dictate that the will of the majority should not
be used to silence the minority. 87 Conversely, it could be argued that
exposure to obscenity is a form of brainwashing which erodes the very
foundations of American morality. Corrupt moral practices become
more prevalent when the public is induced to see them as acceptable
modes of behaviour. Consequently, the majority should be able to
protect the entire public from such inducements.
The problem with the latter argument is that it calls for a construction of the Constitution before the argument can be made legally
valid. The majority in Roth was forced to look beyond the plain meaning of the first amendment in order to reach the conclusion that
obscenity was not subject to its protection. The Court's reasons for
deciding as it did, after making such a construction, have also been
criticized.88 It is interesting to note that even though the Court in Roth
declared obscenity not to be initially protected speech, it has been very
reluctant to declare that particular matter brought before it was, in
fact, obscene.8 9
Although the obscenity test as set out in Roth is constant, matter
which is obscene varies with the changing mores of society. The more
tolerant a society becomes, the more difficult it is to satisfy the test of
patent offensiveness. As a result, the sexually stimulated sixties swept
sociological inhibitions and narrowed the scope of obscenity.
Roth has been modified9" and expanded, 91 but continues to be the
primary source of authority involving obscenity law, at least where
Most men have a strong inclination to suppress opposition even where differences in viewpoint are comparatively slight. But a system of free expression
must be framed to withstand far greater stress. The test of any such system is not
whether it tolerates minor deviations but whether it permits criticism of the
fundamental beliefs and practices of the society.
Id. at 887.
88 See C. REMBAR, supra note 2.
The reasons that the Roth majority stressed were not good. It was true that the
Supreme Court "had always assumed that obscenity was not protected", but assumptions are not law; certain older courts had always assumed that heresy
required burning. The statements on which Brennan relied came from opinions
that had nothing to do with obscenity. They were offhand remarks, tossed out
when obscenity was not in issue. Dicta so obiter cannot constitute precedent.
Id. at 53.
89 See Rogge, supra note 83.
However, after Roth and before Ginzburg v. United States there was at least
one consolation in the existing arrangement for those who felt that there was
no obscenity exception to the first amendment ....
ET]he Court did not specifically find any material which came before it to be obscene, and, on nonobscenity or other grounds, lifted the ban on every film it viewed.
Id. at 17.
90 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
91 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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publication is concerned. The Court in Stanley v. Georgia,
held that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit making mere
private possession of obscene material a crime. 93 Perhaps the decision
is the first step leading up to an eventual reversal of Roth.
In Karolexis v. Byrne,94 a three judge court concluded that Roth
cannot remain intact in view of the Stanley holding. The defendant in
that case was the county district attorney who charged plaintiffs with
violation of the Massachusetts anti-obscenity statute for showing the
film "I Am Curious (Yellow)." Plaintiffs had warned the public of the
film's possible offensiveness and barred minors. For purposes of the
decision, the court assumed that the film was obscene. Plaintiffs contended that Stanley extended to the case where the possessors permitted
paying adults to view a possibly obscene film in a public movie house
and the court accepted the contention by holding:

[W]e think it probable that Roth remains intact only with respect
to public distribution in the full sense, and that restricted distribution, adequately controlled, is no longer to be condemned. 95
By declaring obscenity to be outside first amendment protection
the Supreme Court seemingly collared itself with a constitutional albatross. The Court has to constantly guard against infringement of free
speech by ever increasing anti-obscenity legislation.9 6 This constant duty
could be avoided, without sacrificing first amendment guarantees regarding freedom of expression by declaring obscenity subject to constitutional protection. This would not give obscenity complete immunity from restriction; it would place on the government the burden
of proving clear and present danger of harm because of the publication.
9
Perhaps a reassessment is warranted. 7
Donald J. Maizys
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 568.
94 F.Supp. -, 38 U.S.L.W. 2327 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 1969).
95 Id. at -, 38 U.S.L.W. at 2328.
96 See Rogge, supra note 83.
Not only did Ginzburg and Mishkin produce a new volume of obscenity litigation, but they also brought forth more obscenity legislation. Legislators . . . added
to the mountains of useless obscenity legislation already on the books.
Id. at 41.
97 See Emerson, supra note 32.
The only justifications for suppressing an opinion is that those who seek to
suppress it are infallible in their judgment of the truth. But no individual or
group can be infallible, particularly in a constantly changing world.
Id. at 882.
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